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Abstract— The energy-delay tradeoffs in wireless networks are
studied using a game-theoretic framework. A multi-class multiple-
access network is considered in which users choose their transmit
powers, and possibly transmission rates, in a distributed manner to
maximize their own utilities while satisfying their delay quality-of-
service (QoS) requirements. The utility function considered here
measures the number of reliable bits transmitted per Joule of
energy consumed and is particularly useful for energy-constrained
networks. The Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed non-
cooperative game is presented and closed-form expressions for the
users’ utilities at equilibrium are obtained. Based on this, the
losses in energy efficiency and network capacity due to presence
of delay-sensitive users are quantified. The analysis is extended to
the scenario where the QoS requirements include both the average
source rate and a bound on the average total delay (including
queuing delay). It is shown that the incoming traffic rate and the
delay constraint of a user translate into a “size” for the user,
which is an indication of the amount of resources consumed by
the user. Using this framework, the tradeoffs among throughput,
delay, network capacity and energy efficiency are also quantified.
I. INTRODUCTION
Future wireless networks are expected to support a variety of
services with diverse quality of service (QoS) requirements. For
example, a mixture of delay-sensitive and delay-tolerant users
could exist in the same network. At the same time, most of the
user terminals in a wireless network are battery-powered. As
a result, energy efficiency is also crucial in design of wireless
networks. Therefore, the objective is to use the radio resources
(e.g., power and bandwidth) as efficiently as possible and at
the same time satisfy the QoS requirements of the users in the
network.
In this work, we study the tradeoffs between energy efficiency
and delay QoS using a game-theoretic framework. We consider
a multiple-access network in which each user seeks to locally
choose its transmit power, and possibly its transmission rate,
in order to maximize its own utility (in bits per Joule) and
at the same time satisfy its delay QoS requirements. The
strategy chosen by each user affects the other users through
multiple-access interference. The study of the tradeoffs between
energy efficiency and delay has recently attracted considerable
attention (see for example [1]–[6]). Our non-cooperative game-
theoretic approach allows us to study the energy efficiency-
delay tradeoffs in a multiuser competitive setting. Using this
framework, we quantify the loss in energy efficiency due to the
presence of delay-sensitive users in the network and analyze the
tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity and energy
efficiency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the system model and define the user
utility function. The delay model for the infinite backlog case
is given in Section III. The proposed delay-constrained power
control game and its Nash equilibrium solution are presented in
Section IV. In Section V, we give explicit expressions for the
utilities achieved at Nash equilibrium for a multi-class network.
The delay model for the finite backlog case is given in Sec-
tion VI. In Section VII, we propose a delay-constrained power
and rate control game and give its Nash equilibrium solution.
Numerical results and conclusions are given in Sections VIII
and IX, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a synchronous direct-sequence code-division-
multiple-access (DS-CDMA) network with K users and pro-
cessing gain N (defined as the ratio of symbol duration to chip
duration). We assume that all K user terminals transmit to a
receiver at a common concentration point. The received signal
at the access point sampled at the chip rate over one symbol
duration can be expressed as
r =
K∑
k=1
√
pkhk bksk +w, (1)
where pk, hk, bk and sk are the transmit power, channel
gain, transmitted bit and spreading sequence of the kth user,
respectively, and w is the noise vector which is assumed to be
Gaussian with mean 0 and covariance σ2I. We assume random
spreading sequences for all users.
We assume that data arrives at the user terminal in the form
of M -bit packets. The user transmits the arriving packets at a
rate Rk (bps) and with a transmit power equal to pk Watts.
We consider an automatic-repeat-request (ARQ) mechanism in
which the user keeps retransmitting a packet until the packet is
received at the access point without any errors. Let us define
the utility function of a user to be the ratio of its goodput to its
transmit power, i.e.,
uk =
Tk
pk
. (2)
Goodput is the net number of information bits that are trans-
mitted without error per unit time and is expressed as
Tk = Rkf(γk) (3)
where γk is the output SIR for user k and f(γk) is the “effi-
ciency function” which represents the packet success rate (PSR).
We assume f(γ) to be continuous, increasing and S-shaped1
(sigmoidal) with f(∞) = 1. This is a valid assumption for many
practical scenarios as long as the packet size is reasonably large
(e.g., M = 100 bits). We also require that f(0) = 0 to ensure
that uk = 0 when pk = 0. In general, the efficiency function
depends on the modulation, coding and packet size. A more
detailed discussion of the efficiency function can be found in
[7]. Based on (2) and (3), the utility function for user k can be
written as
uk = Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (4)
This utility function, which has units of bits/Joule, captures very
well the tradeoff between throughput and battery life, and is
particularly suitable for energy-constrained networks.
III. DELAY MODEL FOR THE INFINITE BACKLOG CASE
Let us for now focus on the case in which there are infinitely
many packets to be transmitted by each user. For this case,
we concentrate on the transmission delay. Let X represent the
(random) number of transmissions required for a packet to be
received without any errors. The assumption is that if a packet
has one or more errors, it will be retransmitted. We also assume
that retransmissions are independent from each other. It is clear
that the transmission delay for a packet is directly proportional
to X . Since the packet success rate is given by the efficiency
function f(γ), the probability that exactly m transmissions are
required for the successful transmission of a packet is given by
Pr{X = m} = f(γ) (1− f(γ))m−1 . (5)
We model the delay requirements of a particular as a pair (L, β),
where
Pr{X ≤ L} ≥ β. (6)
In other words, we would like the number of transmissions to
be at most L with a probability larger than or equal to β. Note
that (6) can equivalently be represented as an upper bound on
the delay outage probability. Based on (5), it can be shown that
the delay constraint in (6) is equivalent to
f(γ) ≥ η˜(L, β), (7)
where
η˜(L, β) = 1− (1− β) 1L . (8)
Since f(γ) is an increasing function of γ, we can equivalently
express (7) as
γ ≥ γ˜ (9)
where γ˜ = f−1 (η˜(L, β)). Therefore, the delay constraint in
(6) translates into a lower bound on the output SIR. Since
different users could have different delay requirements, γ˜ is
user dependent. We make this explicit by writing
γ˜k = f
−1 (η˜k) (10)
where η˜k = 1−(1−βk)
1
Lk . A more stringent delay requirement,
i.e., a smaller L and/or a larger β, will result in a higher value
for γ˜.
1An increasing function is S-shaped if there is a point above which the
function is concave, and below which the function is convex.
IV. POWER CONTROL GAME WITH DELAY CONSTRAINTS
Consider the non-cooperative power control game (PCG)
G˜ = [K, {A˜k}, {uk}] where K = {1, ...,K}, and A˜k =
[0, Pmax], which is the strategy set for the kth user and uk is
the utility function given by (4). Here, Pmax is the maximum
allowed power for transmission. Each user chooses its transmit
power in order to maximize its own utility and at the same time
satisfy its delay requirements. We have shown in Section III that
the delay requirements of a user translate into a lower bound
on the user’s output SIR. Hence, the resulting delay-constrained
power control game can be expressed as
max
pk
uk s.t. γk ≥ γ˜k for k = 1, ...,K. (11)
We assume that only those users whose delay requirements
can be met are admitted into the network. For example, for
the conventional matched filter, this translates into having∑K
k=1
1
1+ N
γ˜k
< 1. This assumption makes sense because admit-
ting a user that cannot meet its delay requirement only causes
unnecessary interference for other users. The Nash equilibrium
for the proposed game is a set strategies (power levels) for which
no user can unilaterally improve its own (delay-constrained)
utility function. We now state the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The Nash equilibrium for the proposed
delay-constrained power control game is given by p˜∗k =
min{p∗k, Pmax}, for k = 1, · · · ,K , where p∗k is the transmit
power that results in an output SIR equal to γ˜∗k with γ˜∗k =
max{γ˜k, γ∗}. Here, γ˜k is given by (10) and γ∗ is the (positive)
solution of f(γ) = γf ′(γ). Furthermore, this equilibrium is
unique.
Proof: See [8] for the proof.
The above proposition suggests that at Nash equilibrium, the
output SIR for user k is γ˜∗k , where γ˜∗k depends on the efficiency
function through γ∗ as well as user k’s delay constraint through
γ˜k. Note that this result does not depend on the choice of the
receiver and is valid for all linear receivers.
V. MULTI-CLASS NETWORKS
Let us now consider a network with C classes of users. The
assumption is that all the users in the same class have the same
delay requirements characterized by the corresponding L and
β. Based on Proposition 1, at Nash equilibrium, all the users in
class c will have the same output SIR, γ˜∗(c) = max{γ˜(c), γ∗},
where γ˜(c) = f−1
(
η˜(c)
)
. The goal is to quantify the effect of
delay constraints on the energy efficiency of the network or
equivalently on the users’ utilities.
In order to obtain explicit expressions for the utilities
achieved at equilibrium, we use a large-system analysis. We
consider the asymptotic case in which K,N → ∞ and K
N
→
α <∞. This allows us to write SIR expressions that are inde-
pendent of the spreading sequences of the users. Let K(c) be the
number of users in class c, and define α(c) = limK,N→∞ K
(c)
N
.
Therefore, we have
∑C
c=1 α
(c) = α. It can be shown that [8]
for the matched filter, the decorrelator, and the linear minimum-
mean-square-error (MMSE) detector, the utilities achieved at the
Nash equilibrium are given by
uMFk =
Rkh
2
k
σ2
(
1−
C∑
c=1
α
(c)
γ˜
∗(c)
)
f(γ˜∗(c))
γ˜∗(c)
for
C∑
c=1
α
(c)
γ˜
∗(c)
< 1, (12)
uDEk =
Rkh
2
k
σ2
(
1−
C∑
c=1
α
(c)
)
f(γ˜∗(c))
γ˜∗(c)
for
C∑
c=1
α
(c)
< 1, (13)
and
uMMSEk =
Rkh
2
k
σ2
(
1−
C∑
c=1
α
(c) γ˜
∗(c)
1 + γ˜∗(c)
)
f(γ˜∗(c))
γ˜∗(c)
for
C∑
c=1
α
(c) γ˜
∗(c)
1 + γ˜∗(c)
< 1. (14)
Note that, based on the above equations, we have
uMMSEk > u
DE
k > u
MF
k . This means that the MMSE reciever
achieves the highest utility as compared to the decorrelator and
the matched filter. Also, the network capacity (i.e., the number
of users that can be admitted into the network) is the highest
when the MMSE detector is used. For the specific case of no
delay constraints, γ˜∗(c) = γ∗ for all c.
We can observe from (12)–(14) that the presence of users with
stringent delay requirements results in a reduction in the utility
of all the users in the network. A stringent delay requirement
results in an increase in the user’s target SIR (remember γ˜∗k =
max{γ˜k, γ∗}). Since f(γ)γ is maximal when γ = γ∗, a target
SIR larger than γ∗ results in a reduction in the utility of the
corresponding user. In addition, because of the higher target
SIR for this user, other users in the network experience a
higher level of interference and hence are forced to transmit
at a higher power which in turn results in a reduction in their
utilities (except for the decorrelator, in which case the multiple-
access interference is completely removed). Also, since γ˜∗k ≥ γ∗
and
∑C
c=1 α
(c) = α, the presence of delay-constrained users
causes a reduction in the system capacity (again, except for the
decorrelator). We will demonstrate these losses in Section VIII
using numerical results.
VI. DELAY MODEL FOR THE FINITE BACKLOG CASE
So far, we have assumed that there are infinitely many packets
for transmission at each user terminal. Hence, we have focused
on the transmission delay. Now, we extend the analysis to
consider the case in which the packet arrival rate is finite. For
this case, we take into account the queueing delay as well.
We specify the QoS constraints of user k by (rk, Dk) where
rk is the average source rate and Dk is the upper bound on
average delay. The delay in this case includes both queuing and
transmission delays. The incoming traffic is assumed to have
a Poisson distribution with parameter λk which represents the
average packet arrival rate. Since each packet consists of M
bits, the source rate rk (in bit per second) is given by
rk =Mλk. (15)
As before, we assume that the user keeps retransmitting a packet
until the packet is received at the access point without any
errors. The retransmissions are assumed to be independent. The
incoming packets are assumed to be stored in a queue and
transmitted in a first-in-first-out (FIFO) fashion. The packet
transmission time for user k is defined as
τk =
M
Rk
. (16)
We can represent the combination of user k’s queue and
wireless link as an M/G/1 queue where the traffic is Poisson
with parameter λk (in packets per second) and the service time,
Sk, has the following probability mass function (PMF):
Pr{Sk = mτk} = f(γk) (1− f(γk))m−1 for m = 1, 2, · · ·
(17)
As a result, the service rate, µk, is given by
µk =
1
E{Sk} =
f(γk)
τk
, (18)
and the load factor ρk = λkµk =
λkτk
f(γk)
.
To keep the queue of user k stable, we must have ρk < 1 or
f(γk) > λkτk. Now, let Wk be a random variable representing
the total packet delay for user k. This delay includes the time
the packet spends in the queue as well as the service time. It
can be shown that, for the M/G/1 queue considered here, the
average wait time (including the queuing and service time) for
user k is given by (see [9])
W¯k = τk
(
1− λkτk2
f(γk)− λkτk
)
with f(γk) > λkτk. (19)
We require the average delay for user k’s packets to be less
than or equal to Dk, i.e.,
W¯k ≤ Dk. (20)
Note that Dk cannot be smaller than the transmission time τk.
It can be shown again that the delay constraint in (20) translates
into a lower bound on the output SIR, i.e.,
γ ≥ γˆk (21)
where
γˆk = f
−1(ηˆk) (22)
with ηˆk = λkτk + τkDk −
λkτ
2
k
2Dk
(again, see [9]).
VII. POWER AND RATE CONTROL GAME WITH DELAY
CONSTRAINTS
Consider the non-cooperative joint power and rate control
game (PRCG) Gˆ = [K, {Aˆk}, {uk}] where K = {1, 2, · · · ,K}
is the set of users, Aˆk = [0, Pmax] × [0, B] is the strategy set
for user k with a strategy corresponding to a choice of transmit
power and transmit rate, and uk is the utility function for user
k given by (4). Here, B is the system bandwidth. Each user
chooses its transmit power and rate in order to maximize its
own utility while satisfying its delay QoS requirements. The
resulting delay-constrained power and rate control game can be
expressed as
max
pk,Rk
uk s.t. γk ≥ γˆk and rk
Rk
<
DkRk
M
− 1
DkRk
M
− 12
(23)
for k = 1, · · · ,K where γˆk = f−1(ηˆk) and
ηˆk =
rk
Rk
+
M
DkRk
− Mrk
2DkR2k
. (24)
The second constraint in (23) is to make sure that ηˆk < 1. Note
that the output SIR γk depends on both pk and Rk.
Let us define
Ω∗k =
(
M
Dk
)
1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k + 2(1− f∗)Dkλk
2f∗
.
(25)
where f∗ = f(γ∗) with γ∗ being the (positive) solution of
f(γ) = γf ′(γ). We now state the following proposition.
Proposition 2: If
∑K
k=1
1
1+ B
Ω∗
k
γ∗
< 1, then the proposed
delay-constrained power and rate control game has at least one
Nash equilibrium given by (p∗k, R∗k), for k = 1, · · · ,K , where
R∗k = Ω
∗
k and p∗k is the transmit power that results in an output
SIR equal to γ∗. Furthermore, when there are more than one
Nash equilibrium, (p∗k,Ω∗k) is the most efficient one.
Proof: See [9] for the proof.
We now define the “size” of user k as
Φ∗k =
1
1 + BΩ∗
k
γ∗
. (26)
Therefore, the feasibility condition in Proposition 2 can be
written as K∑
k=1
Φ∗k < 1. (27)
The size of a user is basically an indication of the amount
of network resources consumed by that user. Note that the
QoS requirements of user k (i.e., its source rate rk and delay
constraint Dk) uniquely determine Ω∗k through (25) and, in turn,
determine the size of the user (i.e., Φ∗k) through (26). A larger
source rate or a tighter delay constraint for a user increases the
size of the user. The network can accommodate a set of users
if and only if their total size is less than 1. In Section VIII, we
use this framework to study the tradeoffs among throughput,
delay, network capacity and energy efficiency.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Let us first consider the infinite backlog case as discussed in
Sections III–V. Let us consider a DS-CDMA system with pro-
cessing gain 100. We assume that each packet contains 100 bits
(i.e., M = 100). The transmission rate, R, is 100kbps. A useful
example for the efficiency function is f(γ) = (1− e−γ)M . This
serves as an approximation to the packet success rate that is
very reasonable for moderate to large values of M . We use
this efficiency function for our simulations. Using this, with
M = 100, we have γ∗ = 6.48 = 8.1dB.
We consider a network where the users can be divided into
two classes: delay sensitive (class A) and delay tolerant (class
B). For users in class A, we choose LA = 1 and βA = 0.99
(i.e., delay sensitive). For users in class B, we let LB = 3
and βB = 0.90 (i.e., delay tolerant). Based on these choices,
γ˜∗A = 9.6dB and γ˜∗B = γ∗ = 8.1dB. Without loss of generality
and to keep the comparison fair, we also assume that all the
users are the same distance from the access point. The system
load is α (i.e., K
N
= α) and we let αA and αB represent the load
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Fig. 1. Loss in utility due to presence of users with stringent delay requirements
(α = 0.1).
corresponding to class A and class B users, respectively, with
αA + αB = α. We first consider a lightly loaded network with
α = 0.1 (see Fig. 1). To demonstrate the performance loss due
to the presence of users with stringent delay requirements (i.e.,
class A), we plot uA/u and uB/u as a function of the fraction
of the load corresponding to class A users (i.e., αA/α). Here,
uA and uB are the utilities of users in class A and class B,
respectively, and u represents the utility of the users if they all
had loose delay requirements. Fig. 1 shows the loss in utility
for the matched filter, the decorrelator, and the MMSE detector.
We observe from the figure that for the matched filter both
classes of users suffer significantly due to the presence of delay
sensitive traffic. For example, when half of the users are delay-
sensitive, the utilities achieved by class A and class B users
are, respectively, 50% and 60% of the utilities for the case of
no delay constraints. For the decorrelator, only class A users
suffer and the reduction in utility is smaller than that of the
matched filter. For the MMSE detector, the reduction in utility
for class A users is similar to that of the decorrelator, and the
reduction in utility for class B is negligible.
We repeat the experiment for a highly loaded network with
α = 0.9 (see Fig. 2). Since the matched filter cannot handle such
a significant load, we have shown the plots for the decorrelator
and MMSE detector only. We observe from Fig. 2 that because
of the higher system load, the reduction in the utilities is more
significant for the MMSE detector compared to the case of α =
0.1. It should be noted that for the decorrelator the reduction in
utility of class A users is independent of the system load. This
is because the decorrelator completely removes the multiple-
access interference.
We now present simulation results for the finite backlog case
as discussed in Sections VI and VII. Let us consider the uplink
of a DS-CDMA system with a total bandwidth of 5MHz (i.e.
B = 5MHz). As explained in Section VII, the QoS parameters
of a user define a “size” for that user, denoted by Φ∗k given
by (26). Before a user starts transmitting, it must announce
its size to the access point. Based on the particular admission
policy, the access point decides whether or not to admit the
user. Throughout this section, we assume that the admitted users
choose the transmit powers and rates that correspond to their
efficient Nash equilibrium (see Proposition 2). Fig. 3 shows
the size of a user as a function of the user’s source rate and
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for different delay requirements. It is seen that the higher the
source rate and the tighter the delay requirement, the larger the
size. Now, let us assume that all users in the network have the
same QoS requirements, which means that all the users have
the same size. Based on (27), we can calculate the maximum
number of users whose QoS requirements can be accommodated
(i.e., network capacity). Fig. 4 shows the network capacity as a
function of the source rate for different delay requirements. As
the source rate increases and the delay bound becomes tighter,
the number of users that can be accommodate by the network
reduces. Eventually, as the source rate becomes very large, only
one user can be accommodated by the network. We can also
plot the total goodput (i.e., reliable throughput) of the network.
Fig. 5 shows the total goodput as a function of the source rate
for different delay requirements.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the energy-delay tradeoffs using a game-
theoretic framework. A non-cooperative game is proposed in
which each user chooses its transmit power, and possibly its
transmission rate, to maximize its own utility (in bits per
Joule) while satisfying its delay QoS requirements. The Nash
equilibrium solution for the proposed game is presented. We
have shown that the presence of delay-sensitive users results in
significant losses in the network utility and capacity, and have
quantified the losses. The tradeoffs among throughput, delay,
network capacity and energy efficiency have also been analyzed.
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